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The Right to Know … Or Not: The Freedom of Information Act, 
1955-1974 
Tommy C. Brown 
 
Introduction  
In May 2014, the executive council of the Society of 
American Archivists (SAA) adopted a resolution prepared by the 
Committee on Advocacy and Public Policy detailing the 
organization’s official position regarding the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA). By supporting "all efforts to strengthen the federal 
Freedom of Information Act," the council drew attention to a number 
of loopholes within the law that effectively limited the public’s 
access to government records. According to the resolution, after 
decades of litigation and numerous amendments to the original 
FOIA, federal agencies continue to resist the law’s full 
implementation, interpret the exemption provisions far too broadly, 
and fail to produce requested materials in a timely manner – agencies 
often ignore FOIA requests altogether while sometimes taking 
months or even years to answer requests. Moreover, presidents have 
routinely weakened the law through Executive Orders while 
executive departments find new and inventive ways to stonewall or 
clog up the entire process.
1
 The public’s "right to know" increasingly 
falls victim to what former SAA president Timothy Ericson once 
referred to as the "Iron Curtain" of governmental secrecy.
2
  
Five months after adopting the FOIA resolution, SAA joined 
the American Library Association and dozens of FOIA advocacy 
groups in an open letter to President Barack Obama, urging the 
president to take a more active role in proposing legislation that 
would codify much-needed changes to strengthen the law.
3
 Since the 
September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center, the 
                                                          
1




 Timothy L. Ericson, “Building Our Own ‘Iron Curtain’: The Emergence of 
Secrecy in American Government,” American Archivist 68, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 
2005): 18–52. 
3
 “Coalition Letter to President Obama on FOIA Reforms,” 
http://www.commoncause.org/policy-and-litigation/letters-to-government-
officials/coalition-letter-to-president.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/.  
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government has taken unprecedented steps curtailing access to 
information, a move roundly criticized by transparency advocates 
including many in the archival community. And despite some initial 
success undoing the damage of his predecessor, Barack Obama has 
in recent years been less than enthusiastic fulfilling his own 2009 
directive that "all agencies should adopt a presumption in favor of 
disclosure, in order to renew their commitment to the principles 
embodied in FOIA, and to usher in a new era of open Government."
4
 
Ironically, the White House announced on March 16, 2015 (a day 
celebrated annually as Freedom of Information Day), that the Office 
of Administration would no longer subject itself to FOIA requests, a 
rule originally adopted by the Bush Administration. The Associated 
Press subsequently accused the administration of setting new records 
"for censoring government files or outright denying access to them . . 
. under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act."
5
  
For archivists and other transparency advocates, 
understanding the history of the Freedom of Information Act may 
shed light on recent events and why efforts to maintain open records 
and strengthen the FOIA continue regardless of which political party 
occupies the White House. Few people in the archival community 
would disagree that the FOIA and all of the various state and local 
sunshine laws enacted over the past century have strengthened 
democratic governance throughout the country. Yet, as Timothy 
Ericson asked in his presidential address to the SAA in 2004, "why 
have [archivists] not been more zealous in embracing our ethical 
responsibility to ‘discourage unreasonable restrictions on access’ 
with respect to government records that are being unreasonably 
restricted by the millions?"
6
 To be sure, the organization’s efforts 
over the past several years highlighting the FOIA’s deficiencies and 
advocating for revisions have in part addressed Ericson’s question, 
but much remains to be done.  
                                                          
4
 U.S. President, Memorandum, “Memorandum of January 21, 2009, Freedom of 
Information Act,” Federal Register 74, no. 15 (January 26, 2009): 4683. 
5
 U.S. President, Rules and Regulations, “Removal of Published Rules to Align 
Published Policy with Current Sources of Law,” Federal Register 80 no. 51 
(March 17, 2015): 13757; Associated Press, “Obama Administration Sets New 
Record for Withholding FOIA Requests,” PBS Newshour Rundown, March 18, 
2015, http://www.pbs.org.  
6
 Ericson, “Building Our Own Iron Curtin,” 21. 
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This article explores the early history of the Freedom of 
Information Act from the establishment of the Special Subcommittee 
on Government Information in 1955 to the amendments added in the 
wake of the Watergate scandal in 1974. It argues that, from the 
beginning, executive departments and federal agencies took full 
advantage of the various exemptions within the law to shield 
themselves from prying eyes, a precedent that continues to this day. 
It also looks at the ways in which large companies attempted to use 
the act to gain competitive advantages in the marketplace. Indeed, 
despite congressional intent, it was largely the business world and 
not necessarily the average citizen or the press that routinely sued the 
government for access to information. Finally, it suggests that federal 
courts more often than not ruled in favor of openness when it came 
to FOIA cases. The courts made a concerted effort to balance the 
public’s right to know with the need for security, privacy, and 
confidentiality. Yet, in a handful of important cases, the courts 
handed down decisions that effectively gutted portions of the law, 
prompting Congress to move forward with amendments to 
circumvent these verdicts. In view of the fact that 2016 marks the 
FOIA’s 50th anniversary, this study will hopefully be a timely 
reminder of the law’s significance and the important role that 
archivists play in advocating for open records at all levels of 
government. It is also a reminder that "open records," "freedom of 
information," and "public records" are not just theoretical 
expressions used by archivists who work with records at the national 
level. For nearly five decades the FOIA has influenced, both directly 
and indirectly, state and local legislation that affects archivists 
throughout the United States.  
 
Early History of the FOIA, 1953–1966 
In 1953, attorney and open records advocate Harold Cross 
wrote: "Public Business is the public’s business. The people have the 
right to know. Freedom of information is their just heritage. Without 
that the citizens of a democracy have but changed their kings." Cross 
argued that through a series of executive orders, departmental rules 
and regulations, and various legal statutes "the Executive 
Departments and the administrative agencies have been enabled to 
assert the power to withhold practically all information they do not 
see fit to disclose." His research and subsequent book on government 
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records and public access – sanctioned by and presented as a report 
to the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) – is often 




In the years immediately following the end of World War II, 
most Americans expected the government’s unprecedented war-time 
secrecy operations to diminish as Europe and Asia entered into a 
post-war rebuilding phase. Yet, with the onset of the nuclear age and 
the ensuing Cold War, a wave of anti-communist sentiment washed 
over the nation, engulfing millions of Americans who feared 
increasingly the possibility of a nuclear holocaust. The nation’s 
national security apparatus thus began a whole new phase of secrecy 
and censorship as Republican and Democratic administrations 
worked to protect the nation’s military secrets and clamp down on 
information leaks. Harry Truman issued several executive orders to 
this effect during his presidency, including a 1951 directive that 
placed new restrictions on the flow of government information. 
Three years later, the Eisenhower Administration created the Office 
of Strategic Information (OSI), a move widely criticized by the 
ASNE and other news organizations. The OSI worked to protect the 
nation’s scientific, industrial, and economic information, and protect 
such information from falling into the hands of individuals or 
organizations that might threaten national security. During the 1950s 
and early 1960s, government agencies additionally created over 30 
information classifications, including the popular "Official Use 
Only" and "Confidential" stamps often used to protect information. 
According to Harold Cross, "never before in our national history has 
Presidential power been asserted in terms so all embracing."
8
  
In the wake of such unprecedented levels of secrecy, control, 
and suppression of federal records, the ASNE’s Freedom of 
Information Committee worked diligently compiling information, 
                                                          
7
 Harold L. Cross, The People’s Right to Know: Legal Access to Public Records 
and Proceedings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), xiii, 230–231.  
8
 “Editors for Easing Truman News Ban,” New York Times, November 16, 1952; 
“Agencies Defend Information Bar,” New York Times, November 3, 1955; 
“Congress Urged to Curb Secrecy,” New York Times, December 18, 1955; Herbert 
N. Foerstel, Freedom of Information and the Right to Know: The Origins and 
Applications of the Freedom of Information Act (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 
1999), 19. 
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educating member editors, and combatting government secrecy. 
Committee chair James Pope criticized federal regulations that 
closed off information and insulated federal departments from 
outside scrutiny. "Almost all the administrative news of our 
Government is so controlled," he observed. "Departmental records 
have been put into a privileged, quasi-confidential status under which 
there is no press or public inspection as a matter of right." During the 
1950s, using Cross’s research to build and present their case, the 
committee actively engaged members of Congress and successfully 
recruited a number of influential politicians, including Democratic 
congressman John E. Moss from California.
9
  
As chair of the congressional Special Subcommittee on 
Government Information (commonly known as the Moss 
Subcommittee), Moss quickly became the leading advocate for 
legislative solutions to limitless government secrecy and the 
executive suppression of millions of federal records unrelated to 
national security. To illustrate the absurdity, he once penned an 
article for the New York Times in which he criticized various 
executive departments for invoking the 1789 "Housekeeping Law" as 
an excuse for withholding government documents. "Congress never 
intended – nor did President Washington request – a law permitting 
federal officials to put the padlock of secrecy on public information 
about the operations of Government," Moss argued.
10
 In 1958, in the 
face of opposition from every executive department of the 
presidency, Congress amended the Housekeeping Law by adding one 
sentence to the original language: "this section does not authorize 
withholding information from the public or limiting the availability 
                                                          
9
 Herbert N. Foerstel, Freedom of Information and the Right to Know: The Origins 
and Applications of the Freedom of Information Act (Westport, CT.: Greenwood 
Press, 1999), 17–18.  
10
 John E. Moss, “Anti-Secrecy Law is Hailed by Moss: Californian Calls 
Amending of 1789 Act an Advance in the Right to Know,” New York Times, 
August 17, 1958. Title IV, Executive Departments, Section 161, otherwise known 
as the “Housekeeping Law,” states simply: “The head of each Department is 
authorized to prescribe regulations not inconsistent with law, for the government of 
his Department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution and 
performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of the records, 
papers, and property appertaining to it.”  
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of records to the public."
11
 President Dwight Eisenhower reluctantly 
signed the bill but insisted that the executive branch retained inherent 




In addition to amending the Housekeeping Law, the Moss 
Subcommittee proposed amendments to the Administrative 
Procedure Act, originally adopted in 1946 to establish a uniform set 
of procedural standards for federal administrative agencies to follow. 
Despite specific language directing agencies to publish their rules, 
opinions, orders, and public records, many refused to do so, citing 
provisions within the law that allegedly protected government 
documents held in the "public interest" as well as information related 
to agencies’ internal management. The Federal Aviation 
Administration, for instance, refused to release taped recordings of 
conversations between pilots and air traffic controllers recorded 
during major aircraft accidents, even though the agency routinely 
published edited transcripts of these tragic last-minute exchanges. 
The U.S. Army similarly denied requests from various news 
organizations for testimony transcripts related to hearings and courts-
martial, even though the trials themselves were open to the public. 
The Atomic Energy Commission refused to release photographs of 
the two atomic bombs used by the United States against Japan during 
World War II for fear that doing so would attract "worldwide 
repercussions." The Department of Defense rejected requests to 
make public a study of the nation’s air raid warning system, 
ostensibly because doing so might embarrass various governmental 
agencies in charge of the program. Dozens of similar examples 
seemed to confirm what many feared; that withholding information 




 Moss condemned what he believed to be flagrant violations 
                                                          
11
 An Act to Amend Section 161 of the Revised Statutes With Respect to the 
Authority of Federal Officers and Agencies to Withhold Information and Limit the 
Availability of Records, Pub. L. No. 85-619, 72 Stat. 547 (August 12, 1958). 
12
 “Eisenhower Signs Information Bill,” New York Times, August 15, 1958. 
13
 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of 
the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 88
th
 Cong. 9–12 (October 
28, 1964) (statement of Earl F. English, Dean, School of Journalism, University of 
Missouri).  
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of both the spirit and the letter of the law. "Federal agencies," he 
argued, "have seized on certain words or phrases in the law to keep 
information secret, not only from the public but from Congress. This 
is a tortured interpretation of a law intended to make information 
available."
14
 Even with the addition of new amendments, the 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations continued to 
take advantage of loopholes within the system. 
By 1965, as the Moss Subcommittee continued its mission for 
greater public access to government information, it became clear that 
minor changes to existing laws would never provide adequate 
safeguards against an overly zealous bureaucracy bent on censorship 
and secrecy. By this time, even the most innocuous items, such as 
telephone directories published by the Department of the Navy, 
remained off-limits to the public. At one point the Postmaster 
General decided that the names and salaries of postal employees 
were equally outside the purview of the general public. And the 
Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors decided not to release 




Legislation soon to become the Freedom of Information Act 
accelerated in Congress after Moss gained a number of Republican 
cosponsors, including second-term congressman Donald Rumsfeld 
who became one of the act’s most passionate supporters. Major 
newspaper outlets such as the Washington Post campaigned in favor 
of the law’s passage: "The principles it involves have been 
extensively debated for the last decade … Its great contribution to 
the law is its express acknowledgement that citizens may resort to 
the courts to compel disclosure where withholding violates the 
                                                          
14
 Foerstel, Freedom of Information and the Right to Know, 35–37; Administrative 
Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 79
th
 Congress (1946); “Congress Asked to 
Curb Secrecy,” New York Times, April 25, 1957.  
15
 It should be noted that Moss and other members of congress, primarily 
Democrats, had for years supported a tough, comprehensive pubic records law, but 
executive branch opposition coupled with resistance from prominent legislators in 
both parties killed those attempts. Indeed, in the early 1960s, there were even 
efforts to defund or completely abolish the committee altogether. Michael R. 
Lemov, People’s Warrior: John Moss and the Fight for Freedom of Information 
and Consumer Rights (Madison, NJ.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2011), 
59–60.  





 With a wave of press support and a massive amount of 
political wrangling between the House and Senate versions of the 
bill, Moss finally accomplished the task that he had been working 
toward for over a decade. Lyndon Johnson was reluctant to sign the 
bill into law, however, waiting until the last possible moment to do 
so. Indeed, Johnson’s press secretary at the time, Bill Moyers, later 
claimed that "LBJ had to be dragged, kicking and screaming, to the 
signing ceremony. He hated the very idea of open government, hated 
the thought of journalists rummaging in government closets. He dug 
in his heels and even threatened to pocket veto the bill."
17
 Despite 
serious reservations concerning the new legislation, which the 
president laid out in a press release several days after the event, 
Johnson nevertheless signed the bill into law on Independence Day, 
1966.  
 The FOIA amended section 3 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, directing executive agencies to disclose identifiable 
records upon request unless such records fell within one or more of 
nine specific exemptions.
18
 For the first time, Congress devised a 
mechanism whereby "any person" – a distinct departure from the 
historical model restricting access to everyone except those "properly 
and directly concerned" with government business – could obtain 
information generated by the executive branch, with provisions for 
judicial review should agencies deny access to their records.
19
 In a 
                                                          
16
 Washington Post editorial quoted in Lemov, People’s Warrior, 61. 
17
 Bill Moyers quoted in Lemov, People’s Warrior, 67. 
18
 The FOIA exempted all information “(1) specifically required by Executive 
order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy; (2) 
related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of any agency; (3) 
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute; (4) trade secrets and commercial 
or financial information obtained from any person and privileged or confidential; 
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be 
available by law to a private party in litigation with the agency; (6) personnel and 
medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (7) investigatory files compiled for law 
enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a private party; (8) 
contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, 
on behalf of, or for the use of any agency responsible for the regulation or 
supervision of financial institutions; and (9) geological and geophysical 
information and data (including maps) concerning wells.”  
19
 An Act to Amend Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 
89-487 (July 4, 1966). See also, Dwayne Cox, “Title Company v. County 
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memorandum to the various departments and agencies, Attorney 
General Ramsey Clark noted that the new law "leaves no doubt that 
disclosure is a transcendent goal, yielding only to such compelling 
considerations as those provided for in the exemptions of the act." 
Clark’s directive bolstered congressional intent by insisting that the 
government could no longer operate under an assumption of secrecy; 
the impetus for withholding records now fell upon the agencies 
themselves. Predictably, executive agencies began the process of 
nondisclosure almost immediately, interpreting the exemption 
clauses as broadly as possible, using them as shields against the free 
flow of information. The attorney general’s insistence "that there be 
a change in government policy and attitude" did not always take root 
in the bureaucracy, leading to a whole new era of litigation.
20
  
 Despite Congress’s intentions to the contrary, the exemption 
provisions armed the government with nine newly-codified excuses 
for withholding information. It became increasingly clear that within 
the first few years after the law’s implementation the Freedom of 
Information Act had quickly turned into the freedom from 
information act. Even so, the judicial review provision of the FOIA 
paved the way for citizens and organizations to challenge the 
government in court for unlawfully restricting the free flow of 
information. From 1966 to 1974, the bulk of the legal action 
surrounding the new law largely revolved around four of the nine 
exemptions: executive privilege (1), trade secrets (4), internal 
memoranda (5), and investigatory files (7). In the eight years 
following the law’s implementation approximately half of the FOIA 





The idea of executive privilege is as old as the common law 
itself, dating back in the United States to the first Washington 
Administration. During the 1796 debate over the Jay Treaty, for 
                                                                                                                                      
Recorder: A Case Study in Open Records Litigation, 1874–1918,” American 
Archivist 67, no. 1 (January 2004): 46–57. 
20
 Ramsey Clark, Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information 
Section of the Administrative Procedure Act (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1967), iii. 
21
 Freedom of Information Act Source Book: Legislative Materials, Cases, Articles 
(U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), 120–123. 
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instance, George Washington refused to disclose treaty documents to 
members of the House of Representatives citing the need for secrecy 
and the constitutional provision that only the Senate had the power to 
ratify treaties. Every president since Washington has utilized the 
concept, some much more than others.
22
 Under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, the executive branch frequently construed the phrase 
"in the public interest" to mean whatever the government wanted 
when it came to executive privilege. During the FOIA debate, a 
report from the Congressional Committee on Government 
Operations noted sarcastically: "No government employee at any 
level believes that the "public interest" would be served by disclosure 
of his failures or wrongdoings, but citizens . . . can agree to 
restrictions on categories of information which the President has 
determined must be kept secret to protect the national defense or to 
advance foreign policy." The FOIA attempted to limit this language 
by specifying that information could only be restricted by executive 
order in matters specifically related to secrecy and national defense.
23
  
One of the first court challenges to the executive privilege 
exemption came in 1967 when Julius Epstein, a journalist and 
research associate at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, sued 
the Secretary of the Army over access to records regarding Operation 
                                                          
22
 Jerald Combs, The Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding Fathers 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 176–177. There are many 
examples of executive privilege. During the congressional investigation of the 
Aaron Burr conspiracy, Thomas Jefferson refused to turn over personal letters that 
he believed would compromise confidential informants. Andrew Jackson later 
declined to hand over a copy of a presentation he had made during a cabinet 
meeting outlining his reasons for withdrawing federal funds from the Bank of the 
United States. Theodore Roosevelt once removed records related to the federal 
Bureau of Corporations from a government office building, transported them to the 
White House, and challenged the Senate, who had requested to see the items, to 
come over and retrieve them. “The only way the Senate . . . can get these papers 
now is through my impeachment,” he reportedly declared. See Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), 44–
47, 84. 
23
 Clarifying and Protecting the Right of the Public to Information, H.R. Rep. No. 
1497, 89
th
 Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). In recent decades, both the Bush and Obama 
Administrations have arguably pushed the limits of this provision. From the 
wiretapping and enhanced interrogation controversies under Bush, to current 
debates involving Operation Fast and Furious and the Benghazi attack under 
Obama, both presidents have used the national security provisions in the FOIA to 
shield their administrations from public scrutiny. 
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Keelhaul, the forced repatriation of anti-communist Soviet citizens 
following World War II. These files, originally created by Allied 
Force Headquarters and classified top secret, resided in the U.S. 
Army archives for years until relocated to the National Archives and 
Records Service, General Services Administration (now the National 
Archives and Records Administration or NARA) sometime during 
the late 1950s. The district court and the court of appeals supported 
the government’s rejection of Epstein’s petition for access. By 
refusing to hear the case, the U.S. Supreme Court essentially upheld 
the appeals court decision. Although the opinions are couched in 
legal language consistent with the courts’ interpretation of the 
FOIA’s deference to the executive branch in matters related to 
secrecy, foreign policy, and national defense, the evidence suggests 
that in this case the judiciary was particularly cognizant of Cold War 
realities. Even though the documents in question were more than 20 
years old, there was no need to release information that may further 
complicate foreign relations (or in light of the Vietnam debacle, give 
the government yet another black eye in foreign policy). Epstein 
pointedly criticized the ruling, especially the courts’ decision not to 
invoke an in-camera review of the files: "the courts found that they 
had not the power to subpoena the documents and that classification 
was ‘appropriate.’ How they could decide that classification of about 
300 documents was appropriate without having seen a single one, is 
hard to explain." To be sure, the judiciary’s interpretation of the 
executive privilege exemption in Epstein appears to have been in 
direct conflict with congressional intent that the courts utilize the 




The issue of in-camera inspection came up again in a 
landmark case that Representative Patsy Mink from Hawaii once 
described as the "Waterloo of the Freedom of Information Act." In 
Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 32 members of Congress 
joined her in a request to inspect documents related to an 
underground nuclear test scheduled to take place on Amchitka Island 
in Alaska. Mink and other critics of nuclear testing in the Pacific 
Ocean believed that such powerful blasts along seismically active 
                                                          
24
 Epstein v. Resor, 296 F. Supp. 214 (1969); Epstein v. Resor, 421 F. 2d 930 
(1970); Epstein v. Resor, 398 U.S. 965, 90 S. Ct. 2176 (1970); Julius Epstein, “A 
Case for Suppression,” New York Times, December 18, 1970.  
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zones threatened to set off earthquakes that could potentially create 
deadly tsunamis in the region.
25
 The Cannikin Papers (reflecting the 
operation’s code-name) included about nine items, some classified 
top-secret, which served as an administrative review of the proposed 
test. The Richard Nixon Administration rejected Mink’s request: 
"These recommendations were prepared for the advice of the 
President and involve highly sensitive matter that is vital to our 
national defense and foreign policy."
26
 While the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia sided with the president, the appeals 
court reversed that decision. The executive cannot classify an entire 
file top secret when only a few documents actually fit that 
description. The appeals court ordered the district judge to inspect 
the file in-camera to determine which documents should be properly 
disclosed. The EPA appealed and the case soon became one of the 




In an extraordinarily broad interpretation of the executive 
privilege exemption, the high court’s 5-3 ruling effectively banned 
the lower courts from conducting in-camera inspections of materials 
classified top-secret by the executive branch. In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Potter Stewart shifted the blame to the legislature, 
insisting that Congress "has built into the Freedom of Information 
Act an exemption that provides no means to question an Executive 
decision to stamp a document ‘secret,’ however cynical, myopic, or 
even corrupt that decision might have been."
28
 Justice William 
Douglas countered that the court’s ruling not only misconstrued 
congressional intent, but in effect nullified the FOIA when it came to 
just about anything the executive branch wished to label top secret. 
"The majority makes the stamp sacrosanct," he argued, "thereby 
immunizing stamped documents from judicial scrutiny … The 
Executive Branch now has carte blanche to insulate information from 
                                                          
25
 Despite the controversy, the government conducted the test on November 6, 
1971, without incident. The Mink case, however, continued through the federal 
court dockets for several years after the test.  
26
 John W. Dean to Patsy T. Mink, July 30, 1971. Patsy T. Mink Papers, Library of 
Congress, Washington D.C., 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/mss/images/mink_dean_smst.jpg.  
27
 Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, Civil Action No. 1614-71 (1971); 
Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 464 F. 2d 742 (1971). 
28
 Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 S. Ct. 827 (1973). 
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public scrutiny whether or not that information bears any discernible 




Patsy Mink later described the court’s ruling as a "fabricated 
interpretation of the Act." By removing the "public interest" wording 
from the Administrative Procedure Act, she noted, Congress clearly 
wished to change the way the executive handled information, 
including top secret documents. Why then would the legislature, in 
passing the FOIA, replace one ineffective statute with another 
allowing the executive branch to continue along the same path as 
before? If the court is correct in its ruling, she observed, then 
"Congress declared that any document – for example, the Manhattan 
telephone directory or the Encyclopedia Britannica – could be 
classified ‘Top Secret’ by being so stamped by any of the army of 
federal employees authorized to classify documents under authority 
of the general Executive Order."
30
 Although the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Mink dealt a serious blow to proponents of the FOIA, it 
triggered an immediate response from members of Congress who 
wished to overrule the court’s decision, strengthen the law, and close 
the loopholes. Congress amended the law in 1974 specifically to 
address these issues. 
 
Trade Secrets 
In the 1965 legislation, Congress added an exemption for 
trade secrets specifically to protect confidential business and 
commercial information obtained by the government from 
inadvertently or purposely falling into the hands of competitors or 
the public. Should the Food and Drug Administration, for example, 
collect information related to Kentucky Fried Chicken’s special spice 
mix for Colonel Sander’s Original Recipe, the trade secrets provision 
was designed to protect these types of closely-guarded secrets. Yet, 
despite congressional intent and the seemingly plain language of the 
law, the government often applied this exemption erroneously.  
                                                          
29
Ibid; “Justices Back Full Secrecy of Documents on Security,” New York Times, 
January 23, 1973. 
30
 Patsy T. Mink, “The Mink Case: Restoring the Freedom of Information Act,” 
Pepperdine Law Review 1, vol. 2 (December 1974): 18, 
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2241&context=
plr.  
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In Benson v. General Services Administration, for instance, 
the GSA denied Henry Benson’s request for documents pertaining to 
Auburn Industrial Center’s purchase of real estate previously owned 
by the government. Benson argued that the Industrial Center, in 
which he was a partner, needed the information for clarification 
purposes in order to address an IRS inquiry into the transaction. 
Citing the trade secrets exemption, GSA insisted that the records 
contained confidential and privileged financial information and were 
therefore closed to public inspection. The U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Washington disagreed, ruling that all of the 
requested documentation, with the exception of an outside credit 
report, should be disclosed to Benson. The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit later affirmed the lower court’s decision. Both 
courts agreed that since almost all of the information was directly 
related to Auburn Industrial Center, the GSA had no legal grounds 
under the FOIA to withhold the documents.
31
  
In a similar ruling, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia granted Grumman Aircraft Corporation’s request to 
review orders and opinions issued by the government Renegotiation 
Board, despite the Board’s insistence that the documents contained 
confidential information protected by the trade secrets exemption. 
The Board held extraordinary power over companies with 
government contracts, including the authority to demand that 
Grumman repay millions of dollars in excess profits from one of its 
fighter aircraft projects. Grumman’s attorneys insisted that 
undisclosed government documents would help prove their case. The 
appeals court suggested that the Board redact confidential 
information but otherwise ordered the release of all requested 
documents. Writing for the majority, Judge David Bazelon insisted 
that, "in the future, the Board can avoid the problem by deleting 
identifying details from each opinion or order and then making it 
available to public inspection as a matter of course."
32
 In both 
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Benson and Grumman, the courts ruled strongly in favor of 
disclosure even if it meant additional headaches for government 
departments in terms of time and manpower spent redacting 
information or otherwise preparing documents for public release.
33
 
Although the government eventually released a host of documents 
related to the national board, Grumman insisted that it make all 
information available, including documentation from local and 
regional boards. At this point the Supreme Court ruled that local and 
regional board decisions were not permanent decisions and were 




In cases involving the trade secrets exemption, the judiciary 
attempted to balance the people’s right to know with the 
government’s responsibility to maintain confidentiality. Because the 
FOIA statute never adequately defined the term "confidential" the 
courts were forced to come up with a working definition of their 
own. By examining both case law and the congressional record the 
courts generally agreed that information placing government 
contractors at a competitive disadvantage or creating an atmosphere 
of distrust that threatened to derail future projects would be 
considered confidential.
35
 Yet, despite this understanding, the courts 
did not always see eye to eye in their application. In Petkas v. Staats, 
for instance, the D.C. District Court upheld the government’s Cost-
Accounting Standards Board in their decision to deny access to 
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financial disclosure statements previously submitted by Lockheed 
Aircraft and three other major American corporations. The court 
conducted an in-camera inspection of the documents in question and 
concluded that the data contained sensitive and confidential 
information. The appeals court, however, reversed and remanded the 
decision, insisting that the district court reconsider whether 
disclosure would indeed hinder the government’s future ability to 
obtain needed information or substantially harm the companies’ 




From cost analyses to employment procedures and project 
details, federal law requires government contractors to submit all 
manner of information documenting their business and hiring 
practices. Once the FOIA went into effect, companies began using 
the trade secrets exemption as well as other provisions in the law to 
prevent federal agencies from disclosing these reports to the public. 
These "reverse FOIA suits," as they have often been called, are those 
in which the "submitter of information – usually a corporation or 
other business entity, that has supplied an agency with data on its 
policies, operations, or products – seeks to prevent the agency that 
collected the information from revealing it to a third party in 
response to the latter’s FOIA request."
37
 In such cases, as the 
argument goes, the law requires the government to withhold the 
information. As a government defense contractor, for instance, 
Hughes Aircraft Company submitted affirmative action plans to the 
Department of Labor. The reports purportedly contained confidential 
information related to minority hiring, firing, and promotion 
practices. When the National Organization for Women filed a FOIA 
request to inspect Hughes’s 1974 plan for the Culver City Plant, the 
company cried foul, insisting that the plan fell under the trade secrets 
exemption. Disclosure would reveal labor costs, they argued, 
allowing competitors to calculate profit margins and underbid 
Hughes on future contracts. The U.S. District Court for the Central 
District of California found that Hughes’s affirmative action plan had 
only "marginal utility … to a competitor." Moreover, Hughes and 
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other aircraft manufacturers routinely shared wage and salary 
information with one another, thus undercutting the entire premise of 
the company’s case. The court concluded that Hughes was 
apparently "more concerned about embarrassment" than it was about 
its competitors gaining a competitive edge as contractors.
38
  
In a similar reverse FOIA case, Sears, Roebuck, and 
Company sued the General Services Administration to prevent 
disclosure of its affirmative action plans and equal opportunity 
documents. Sears contended that releasing the information would 
allow other companies to calculate labor costs, expansion plans, and 
sales volume, thus undermining their competitive position and 
violating the trade secrets exemption. The D.C. District Court found 
that Sears had produced no real evidence to support their assertions 
and ordered the information released. Both Hughes and Sears 
illustrate that in reverse FOIA cases involving the trade secrets 
exemption, the courts often established a high bar for companies 
attempting to prevent the government from disclosing their 
information. Yet, the courts were not unsympathetic to those who 
demonstrated a potential for real harm. After reviewing evidence and 
hearing testimony from the Conference of National Park 
Concessioners, for example, the D.C. Circuit Court agreed that 
disclosing concessioner information would compromise their 
competitiveness and damage their businesses. Experts testified that 
because the Park Service required its concessioners to provide 
detailed information related to assets, liabilities, net worth, cash 
position, investments, accounts receivable, expenses, fixed assets, 
and other highly sensitive business data, releasing such data would 
undercut concessioners’ position within the market.  
 
Internal Memoranda 
While the trade secrets exemption of the FOIA proved to be a 
useful tool for government agencies, individuals, and businesses 
pursuing nondisclosure, the internal memoranda exemption (which 
includes both inter-agency and intra-agency communications) often 
provided even more room for bureaucratic mischief. Congress added 
the exemption to protect the free flow of ideas within government 
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agencies, safeguard the deliberative process from outside 
interference, and prevent premature disclosure of rules and decisions 
prior to finalization. Yet, federal agencies invoked the provision so 
often that they found themselves subject to a flurry of litigation. 
Judge David Bazelon, known widely for his support of the FOIA, 
noted that the exemption "encourages the free exchange of ideas 
among government policy makers, but it does not authorize an 
agency to throw a protective blanket over all information by casting 
it in the form of an internal memorandum."
39
  
 Bazelon also argued that internal memoranda could in fact be 
subject to disclosure in cases where the government cited such 
documentation as the sole evidence for taking action. In 1968, the 
Maritime Subsidy Board ordered American Mail Line to refund 
nearly $3.3 million in excess subsidy overpayments. As a branch 
within the U.S. Maritime Administration, the Subsidy Board has the 
power to demand repayment of subsidies considered to be fraudulent 
or excessive. Although the board based its decision on a thirty-one 
page memorandum prepared internally by board staff, it included 
only the last five pages of the document in its official order. When 
American Mail Line asked to inspect the full report the government 
refused, citing the internal memoranda exemption of the FOIA. The 
D.C. District Court initially ruled in the government’s favor, but the 
Court of Appeals promptly reversed the decision. The court declared, 
"the question which must be decided is whether an administrative 
agency may take affirmative action against a private party by means 
of a decision in which it states that the only basis for such action is a 
certain specified memorandum and then refuse to disclose the 
memorandum to the party affected by the action."
40
 In Gulick, the 
actions of the Maritime Subsidy Board clearly violated the spirit, if 
not the letter, of the internal memoranda exemption. Had the board’s 
actions been allowed to stand, it would have sent a negative message 
to every government contractor and business involved with federal 
agencies. 
 The International Paper Company used the arguments in 
Gulick as the basis for its FOIA lawsuit against the Federal Power 
Commission (FPC). International wanted access to staff memoranda 
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as well as other documentation related to FPC legal action and 
regulatory decisions directly governing (and adversely affecting) the 
paper company’s natural gas business. The Power Commission 
denied the request and both the district court and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained the commission’s decision 
for nondisclosure. The appeals court concluded that, unlike Gulick, 
the memoranda sought in this case was not the sole basis for the 
government’s decisions in its dealings with International, nor did 
correspondence to and from FPC staffers qualify as final orders 
subject to FOIA requests. The viewpoints of individual staff 
members could be easily misconstrued or even "grossly misleading, 
especially when applied to the ultimate findings and conclusions 




 The courts in Gulick and International Paper established the 
principle that "pre-decisional memoranda" not referenced in final 
agency decisions would be exempt from disclosure, while 
"decisional memoranda" would be accessible. The courts argued that 
while the pre-decisional phase of the policymaking process is the 
point at which adversarial views and opinions are expressed and 
confidentiality required, the decisional phase reflects an agency’s 
finished product and must be open to the public.
42
 Thus, the 
government had an obligation to fulfill Freedom of Information 
requests involving internal memoranda linked to federal agencies’ 
final decisions. Two Freedom of Information suits launched in the 
early 1970s, Sterling Drug v. Federal Trade Commission and the 
Grumman case mentioned previously, became perfect test cases for 
this interpretation of the internal memoranda provision of the law. 
In 1966, Sterling Drug acquired the Lehn & Fink company, 
the maker of Lysol brand disinfectants and deodorizers. When the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) declared the acquisition a 
violation of the Clayton Act, Sterling asked to inspect FTC records 
regarding other similar acquisitions for use in its argument against 
the commission – specifically those documents related to Miles 
Laboratories’ (a competitor) successful acquisition of the S.O.S. 
                                                          
41
 International Paper Company v. Federal Power Commission, 438 F.2d 1349 
U.S. App. (1971).  
42
 Gregory Waples, “The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven-Year 
Assessment,” Columbia Law Review 74, no. 5 (June, 1974): 939. 





 The FTC denied Sterling’s request, prompting the 
company to launch a FOIA suit against one of the most powerful 
agencies in Washington D.C. The district court initially ruled in 
favor of the government, but the D.C. Court of Appeals divided the 
sought-after information into three categories: documents prepared 
by the commission staff, those prepared by individual commission 
members, and those issued by the full commission. The court 
declared all staff and commissioner communications to be pre-
decisional and hence off limits to disclosure. Any documents or 
portions of documents emanating from the commission as a whole, 
however, must be disclosed to Sterling Drug. "These are not the 
ideas and theories which go into the making of the law," the majority 
opinion concluded, "they are the law itself, and as such should be 
made available to the public." In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice 
Bazelon questioned whether all of the documents in the first two 
categories "need never be disclosed." The burden of proof should be 
upon the FTC to demonstrate that every document, regardless of any 
artificial categories, should be withheld from the public.
44
  
In Grumman, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed an earlier 
verdict by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia that 
decisions made by the Renegotiation Board’s regional offices were 
considered final orders and thus available for public inspection. The 
court accepted the government’s argument that opinions passed by 
the regional boards were essentially "pre-decisional consultative 
memoranda" subject to change or rejection by the national Board, 
thus constituting internal memoranda. Simply put, the Freedom of 
Information Act guaranteed the availability of final opinions issued 
by government agencies, but the high court in this case determined 
that regional reports were not final; only the national board could 
issue final opinions. In a similar case, Wellford v. Hardin, the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture denied Harrison Wellford’s request to 
inspect bi-weekly reports of the Slaughter Inspection Division as 
well as the minutes of the National Food Inspection Advisory 
Committee. The USDA cited, among other provisions, the internal 
memoranda exemption of the FOIA. The U.S. District Court for the 
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District of Maryland initially ruled in favor of Wellford but later 
reversed itself when Secretary of Agriculture Clifford Hardin 
produced additional documentation verifying, to the court’s 
satisfaction at least, that the bi-weekly reports and committee 




The courts in Gulick, Sterling Drug, Grumman, and Wellford 
demonstrated a tendency to side with the government. Since the 
FOIA was such a monumental departure from the way in which the 
government usually operated, the courts were forced to interpret 
several provisions largely from scratch. To be sure, congressional 
intent regarding the internal memoranda exemption often proved 
elusive and sometimes contradictory. Even Congressman Moss, who 
argued that all documents related to agency decisions should be 
disclosed once final action was taken on a matter, admitted that, "I 
don’t think it possible at this time to go that far in drafting 
language."
46
 Moreover, despite the judiciary’s overall attempt to err 
on the side of openness whenever possible, the courts exhibited great 
respect for administrative procedure when it came to the internal 
workings of governmental agencies. Judges were mindful of their 
role in protecting the bureaucracy’s need for internal policy debates 
free from outside interference or fear that honest opinions may one 
day end up in the hands of the media or be used in legal action 
against individuals or agencies.  
 
Investigatory Exemption 
 As it turned out, the internal memoranda exemption was the 
only USDA argument the court accepted in the Wellford v. Hardin 
decision. The bulk of the government’s case stemmed from the 
USDA’s use of the investigatory exemption in the FOIA. This 
provision quickly became one of the government’s favorite shields 
against the free flow of information, and the courts weighed in 
frequently to determine the legal bounds of this heavily litigated 
exemption. The provision protects information related to federal law 
enforcement endeavors by guarding against the disclosure of files 
that would reveal the government’s investigatory methods and legal 
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strategies. It also protects the identity of confidential sources, an 
essential element in any investigation. Importantly, despite the 
government’s abuse of the exemption, the courts attempted to 
accommodate challengers whenever possible. In the Wellford 
decision, for example, Harrison Wellford, Executive Director for the 
Center for the Study of Responsive Law, requested copies of 
warning letters previously sent by the USDA to non-federally-
inspected meat and poultry processors suspected of engaging in 
interstate commerce.
47
 Both the district court and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals rejected the government’s contention that these records were 
investigatory files on the grounds that the information had already 
been delivered to the parties involved and would not interfere with 
any ongoing investigations. The appeals court rejected the USDA’s 
argument that releasing the reports would discourage non-federally-
inspected meat and poultry plants from voluntarily complying with 
federal guidelines. "The Freedom of Information Act was not 
designed to increase administrative efficiency," the court reasoned, 
"but to guarantee the public’s right to know how the government is 
discharging its duty to protect the public interest."
48
  
 The courts, however, were careful to ensure federal agencies’ 
ability to carry out ongoing investigations and protect confidential 
sources. In 1967, the Food and Allied Workers of Puerto Rico 
accused Barceloneta Shoe Corporation of violating the Labor 
Management Relations Act. The National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) interviewed witnesses, Barceloneta asked to inspect these 
records prior to the hearing, and the NLRB claimed that the records 
fell under the investigatory files exemption and were therefore off 
limits to disclosure during the investigation. The U.S. District Court 
for the District of Puerto Rico agreed – premature disclosure could 
hinder the government’s ability to collect information during future 
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 This reasoning proved especially true in cases 
involving government informants. In 1971, Cowles 
Communications, a multimedia news corporation, asked to inspect 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) files on Salvatore 
Marino, a member of organized crime operating in San Jose, 
California. Although the INS invoked the investigatory files 
exemption, Cowles contended that the provision did not apply 
because the government had no pending proceedings in the Marino 
case. The district court ruled that disclosing such documents might 
endanger informants, harm the government’s ability to investigate, 
and violate personal privacy. On the other hand, the government 
could not withhold the records by merely concluding that they fell 
under the exemption. The court ultimately decided to conduct an in-




Both Barceloneta and Cowles demonstrate the courts were 
particularly hesitant to release information related to ongoing 
investigations, especially if that evidence would eventually become 
available through the customary discovery process. The courts were 
equally hesitant to release documents containing law enforcement 
techniques or the various methods for gathering evidence. When the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) indicted Anthony Imbrunone for tax 
evasion, the defendant asked to inspect portions of the manuals used 
by the Audit Division in their investigation. Imbrunone considered 
these documents administrative in nature, but the government 
claimed they fell under the FOIA exemption for law enforcement 
material. In a detailed affidavit, Singleton B. Wolfe, director of the 
Audit Division of the IRS, explained that the manuals in question 
contained "specific investigatory techniques and tolerances which 
provide [IRS] personnel with an effective and efficient methodology 
to be used in conjunction with their law enforcement efforts." The 




Not all of the cases involving law enforcement techniques 
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were as straightforward as the Imbrunone case. In some instances the 
courts applied this provision so broadly that it seemed to undermine 
the whole purpose of the Freedom of Information Act. In 1971, 
Frank Frankel and other stockholders of Occidental Petroleum 
Corporation asked the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
to inspect records of a recently-settled government investigation into 
the company’s real estate business. The government’s case against 
Occidental prompted the stockholders’ class action suit. After 
multiple requests and waiting more than two months without a 
response from the SEC, Frankel launched a FOIA suit against the 
agency. While the SEC argued that the requested documents were 
exempt as investigatory files, the district court ordered the files 
released. On appeal, however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the ruling, contending that disclosure threatened to reveal 
the agency’s investigatory techniques and procedures. In his dissent, 
Judge James L. Oakes argued that the district court’s previous in-
camera inspection of the files should have been more than adequate 
to dispense the investigatory argument and release the documents, 
especially since the government’s case against Occidental had 
already been settled. Indeed, it seems illogical that out of 7,000 
documents related to the investigation, none apparently fit the circuit 
court’s criteria for disclosure.
52
  
The courts tended to be somewhat more balanced in cases 
where the government invoked nondisclosure on inactive or pending 
investigatory files that may or may not ever be used in any future 
litigation. In the late 1960s the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) investigated reported incidents of off-board trading – the 
purchase or sale of market securities by sidestepping the exchange. 
M.A. Schapiro & Co., a large Wall Street investment brokerage, 
asked to inspect the records accumulated during the course of the 
investigation. When the SEC denied their request, the company filed 
suit under the FOIA. The D.C. District Court ruled the records did 
not fall under any of the four exemptions invoked by the 
government. The investigatory files provision did not apply because 
the SEC had no plans to pursue legal proceedings "within the 
reasonably near future." The court noted that it had been six years 
since the end of the investigation "and these documents have not 
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been, nor is it alleged that they will be, the basis for either a criminal 
or civil action against anyone."
53
 In a similar case, the D.C. District 
Court supported Fred Black Jr.’s request to inspect FBI files 
connected with an illegal 1964 surveillance operation conducted by 
the agency against Black. Not only did the government admit that the 
operation was not for law enforcement purposes, the court noted that 
it had "been over ten years since the surveillance has been conducted, 
and the [FBI] has not brought an action against [Black] and admits 
all investigation for any possible action has been long since 
concluded. Under these circumstances, the investigatory file 
exemption is obviously not applicable."
54
 
 In all of these cases, and many more not included here, 
government agencies consistently invoked the law 
enforcement/investigatory exemption in their efforts to shield 
themselves from the public’s prying eyes. The federal courts at every 
level muddied the waters further by issuing conflicting rulings. Some 
courts favored blanket exemptions for any and all records compiled 
for law enforcement purposes, while others preferred a more narrow 
interpretation that favored disclosure or partial disclosure. In any 
event, the investigatory provision remained controversial and became 
one of the areas of most concern when Congress began investigating 
the FOIA’s effectiveness in the early 1970s and amended the law in 
1974.  
 
The 1974 Amendments 
 The federal government’s abuse of the four exemptions 
presented in this study – executive privilege, trade secrets, internal 
memoranda, and investigatory – was in many ways responsible for 
Congress’s push to strengthen the law. In 1972, six years after the 
enactment of the Freedom of Information Act, the congressional 
Committee on Government Operations began the process of 
interviewing witnesses, gathering facts, and presenting its case for 
amending the original legislation. The report revealed that while 
thousands of citizens had gained access to government information 
through the new law, an entrenched culture of secrecy within the 
executive branch continued to put up significant roadblocks. Federal 
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agencies in both the Johnson and Nixon administrations developed 
increasingly sophisticated techniques for evading disclosure. The 
FOIA’s nine exemptions, designed to be narrowly-defined 
exceptions to the rule, quickly became weapons in the government’s 
fight against openness. In his testimony before Congress, Ralph 
Nader concluded that government "officials at all levels . . . have 
systematically and routinely violated both the purpose and specific 
provisions of the law. These violations have become so regular and 
cynical that they seriously block citizen understanding and 
participation in government. Thus the Act, designed to provide 




 A Congressional Research Service statistical analysis 
conducted in 1972 at the behest of Congress documented a whole 
host of "shortcomings," due primarily to bureaucratic resistance to 
records disclosure. While some agencies furnished detailed data with 
specific information, others submitted incomplete, distorted, or 
otherwise unusable information. A few departments manipulated the 
data by counting thousands of routine requests for information as 
FOIA requests. The Department of the Air Force was "way out of 
line" when it reported that it had received over 200,000 formal FOIA 
requests, 170 percent more than the next highest number. 
Conversely, the Civil Service Commission reported zero formal 
requests, a clear indication that the agency either kept no records or 
"apparently has no interest in implementing the law." Agencies 
routinely cited multiple provisions within the law to deny access; the 
nine exemptions proved to be especially popular in this regard. The 
average response time for initial FOIA requests was approximately 
33 days for all agencies, while the response time for appeals varied, 
with the Small Business Administration averaging eight days and the 
Department of Labor taking nearly four months. At least four 
agencies "seem to be in no hurry to expedite requests for 
information" under the FOIA. Even when individuals sued it 
sometimes took years to gain access, and that is only in those cases 
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where the government lost.
56
  
 Dozens of witnesses testified before the Subcommittee on 
Foreign Operations and Government Information – chaired by 
staunch FOIA advocate William S. Moorhead from Pennsylvania – 
providing even more evidence for strengthening the act. Attorneys 
for the Center for the Study of Responsive Law, for example, 
explained the USDA’s "contamination tactic," one of many devices 
designed to discourage freedom of access. When the Center asked to 
inspect folders containing the records of nonfarm pesticide use, the 
agency refused, claiming that the requested files were intermixed 
with confidential documents that may disclose trade secrets. "It 
would be too much work for our staff to read through all of the 
correspondence to remove references to confidential information," 
one official responded. On its face this excuse may appear plausible 
if not for the fact that the Center had already requested the same 
documents two years prior, giving the government plenty of time to 
rework the files. "The final straw," attorney Harrison Wellford noted, 
"was when the USDA stated that if the information were made 
available, it would cost $91,840 to prepare the registration files for 
public viewing."
57
 In testimony after testimony, these kinds of tactics 
appear to have been routine operating procedure for a number of 
federal agencies and departments. 
 During the hearings, Congressman Moorhead expressed 
disappointment that members of the press, who had been some of the 
most outspoken advocates in favor of the original 1966 legislation, 
were among the least likely to seek legal action against the 
government. "After more than four years of operation," he observed, 
"only a handful of newspapers … have actually invoked the 
provisions of the act to the limit by going into the Federal courts to 
fight for their first amendment rights."
58
 Ward Sinclair of the 
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Louisville Courier-Journal responded that journalists must often 
decide whether pursuing information in the face of uncooperative 
agency officials is worth the time and effort, especially when the 
pressure of meeting deadlines runs contrary to the government’s 
tendency to drag things out for weeks or months at a time. On one 
occasion, he explained, the Department of the Interior rejected 
Sinclair’s written requests for copies of the Treleaven Project, a 
costly project related to coal mining safety that the agency came 
close to funding without any bids or alternative proposals. For four 
months the department stonewalled, claiming that the report fell 
under the internal memoranda provision, "hiding all the while behind 
the Information Act." Their lawyers, Sinclair observed, "were able to 
correctly surmise that it was not a document absolutely essential to 
my work and they correctly guessed that it was not an issue that a 
Kentucky newspaper was likely to go to court over."
59
  
 Another reporter, James B. Steele of the Philadelphia 
Inquirer, testified about his investigation into the Philadelphia office 
of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). He uncovered a 
profiteering scheme where speculators purchased old, dilapidated 
houses, made minimal, low-cost repairs, then sold the homes to poor 
families at inflated prices, all with the blessings of the FHA. With 
evidence suggesting a conspiracy between FHA staff, federal fee 
appraisers, and speculators, Steele requested the names of the 
appraisers and specific appraisal information. When the local office 
rejected his initial request, the Inquirer submitted a formal FOIA 
request to both the regional office of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) and the national office in Washington, D.C. 
HUD secretary George Romney reluctantly released the names of the 
appraisers but argued that the appraisals themselves were protected 
by the interagency memoranda and investigatory exemptions of the 
FOIA, a claim later rejected by the courts. Congressman John Moss, 
who not only championed the original law but was also a licensed 
real estate broker, voiced his opinion in no uncertain terms. "I think 
this is about as outrageous a thing as I have heard," he remarked. "I 
think it a perfect example of the outrageous attitude … within the 
bureaucracy which grows ever more ominous in its desire to control 
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what we know, think, and do." In his concluding remarks, Steele 
testified that despite a court order some ten days earlier HUD had 
still not released the documents.
60
 
 The subcommittee also heard testimony from Archivist of the 
United States James B. Rhoads and Deputy Archivist James E. 
O’Neill. To fulfill its dual role of caring for the nation’s non-current 
records and making them available to the public, the National 
Archives and Records Service operated fifteen Federal Records 
Centers, six presidential libraries, and housed some 30 billion pages 
of federal records. During the hearing, much of the testimony 
revolved around the department’s efforts to manage and declassify 
over 150 million classified documents, dating mostly from the World 
War II era.
61
 Although both archivists explained the importance of 
working with members of the intelligence community to accomplish 
this task as quickly as possible without compromising military 
secrets, committee members were bluntly skeptical about involving 
other agencies in the decision-making process. Congressman 
Moorhead summarized the committee’s position: 
 
If this committee could do one thing, it is to urge you 
to be on the side of the people’s right to know, be 
there, advocate, prevail. I would like to see you have 
the ultimate decisionmaking power at least for 
documents past a certain age. It seems to me that the 
Archives has a better grasp of that than do the 
naturally secrecy-minded people of the CIA, or State 
or Defense Departments. So I urge you to be strong 
and tough and don’t let them maintain unnecessary 
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Under intense questioning, both archivists assured the committee of 
their commitment to providing public access to the largest number of 
documents possible, whether classified or not. As such, they argued, 
their dedication to the Freedom of Information Act and the concept 
of open records was solid.  
Between 1972 and 1973, the subcommittee heard testimony 
from nearly 200 witnesses including lawyers, journalists, newspaper 
editors, citizen action groups, and representatives from every major 
government agency and department. Ironically, more than a dozen 
federal agencies revised their FOIA regulations just before or during 
the course of the congressional hearings; two departments, the 
Department of Labor and Department of Transportation, released 
new regulations only hours before their representatives testified 
before the subcommittee. Once testimonies ended, the Foreign 
Operations and Government Information Subcommittee began 
deliberation on a series of amendments to the FOIA. In 1974, 
Congress enacted new rules to strengthen the Freedom of 
Information Act. 
 Between the congressional hearings and the adoption of new 
legislation in 1974, two important events helped to push the 
amendments through. The Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in 
Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink angered open records 
advocates and surprised members of Congress. The court eliminated 
in-camera review, effectively stripping the judiciary of its power in 
handling FOIA requests on national defense and foreign policy 
matters, thus giving the executive branch "carte blanche" in these 
areas. It then blamed Congress for the law’s "unquestioning 
deference to the Executive."
63
 Senator Edmund Muskie from Maine 
took issue with the court’s suggestion that Congress was the culprit. 
The whole point of the FOIA was to open access, not give the 
executive more excuses for secrecy. "Obviously, something must be 
done to correct this strained court interpretation," he argued. Why 
should the American people trust a federal judge to deal 
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appropriately with competing claims in the Watergate scandal "but 
not trust him or his colleagues to make the same unfettered 
judgements in matters allegedly connected to the conduct of defense 
or foreign policy."
64
 Muskie’s reference to Watergate reveals the 
second important event. The Watergate debacle simply reinforced an 
already skeptical public’s view that the executive branch was out of 
control. The actions of the Nixon Administration before, during, and 
after the Watergate scandal motivated Congress to move more 
quickly on the FOIA amendments. Along with the Mink decision, 
Watergate created one of those rare perfect storms for getting things 
done in Congress.  
 Both houses of Congress passed similar bills that were 
eventually reconciled in conference. In October 1974, less than two 
months after Nixon’s resignation from the presidency, the Senate 
approved unanimously the FOIA conference report, with the House 
following suit 349 to 2. President Gerald Ford, who had recently 
pledged "an open and candid administration," promptly vetoed the 
bill, insisting that the new amendments "would violate constitutional 
principles, and give less weight before the courts to an executive 
determination involving the protection of our most vital national 
defense interests."
65
 Congressman Moorhead condemned the 
president’s action and urged his colleagues in both houses to override 
Ford’s veto. "Such unwarranted and illogical action," he argued, 
coming just weeks after the president’s open government pledge 
"forces us to recall all of the sordid happenings of his predecessor’s 
administration that were first spawned and then covered up by abuses 
of Government secrecy."
66
 While the vote in the Senate was much 
closer than the original vote on passage, each house secured the 
necessary two-thirds majorities to override the president’s veto. In 
ordinary times such solidarity between the parties would be nearly 
impossible, but the poisoned political atmosphere that existed 
between the legislative and executive branches in the wake of the 
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Watergate affair opened the door for a bipartisan override. 
 The amendments corrected a number of weaknesses in the 
original law. First and foremost, Congress addressed its displeasure 
with judicial interpretations of the executive privilege exemption (as 
demonstrated in Mink) as well as the investigatory memoranda 
provision. Indeed, the vast majority of congressional debate focused 
on these two items. Congress narrowed the exemption for top secret 
information to documents specifically designated by executive order 
and properly classified as such. Importantly, it authorized the courts 
to inspect files in-camera when necessary, and required agencies to 
release any "reasonably segregable portion" of a file or document. As 
far as the investigatory exemption is concerned, Congress wanted to 
crack down on the government’s tendency to invoke nondisclosure 
on entire files or folders, even when the majority of documents 
within the files were unrelated to an investigation. Under the new 
law, once an agency classified "records" (as opposed to the old 
terminology "files") as investigatory, they must then meet at least 
one of six new criteria to legally withhold the records from the 
public.
67
 In other words, if the government could not prove that 
releasing investigatory records would cause harm in one of the six 
areas, then it was obliged to disclose the information. 
 The new amendments addressed several other issues 
discussed during the congressional hearings. Congress imposed well-
defined timetables by limiting agencies to ten working days to reply 
to initial requests, twenty days to reply to appeals, with an additional 
ten day allowance for unusual or unforeseen circumstances.
68
 The 
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law required agencies to provide documents at no charge or a 
reduced charge in cases where the information would benefit the 
public as a whole. It also required government agencies and 
departments to publish quarterly indexes and distribute or otherwise 
make them available to the public at or below cost. Finally, Congress 
added additional provisions for disciplining government personnel 
who "acted arbitrarily or capriciously" in cases involving 
nondisclosure. 
 While members of the Ford Administration predicted dire 
consequences resulting from the new law’s implementation, no such 
catastrophes ever materialized. Archivist Trudy Peterson observed in 
1980 that despite some unforeseen consequences – which is to be 
expected from any piece of legislation – the amended FOIA "is 
working, releasing some information that the agencies would like to 
withhold and withholding some information that requesters would 
like released, probably striking a balance."
69
 Since 1974, the 
Freedom of Information Act has been amended seven times, with 
additional executive orders issued by Ronald Reagan, George W. 
Bush, and Barack Obama also affecting the law’s standing. Requests 
for information under the FOIA quadrupled in 1975 and the numbers 
have continued to climb ever since. In 2014, federal agencies and 
departments received over 700,000 requests under the law, released 
information either in full or in part 55 percent of the time, denied 
over 38,000 requests, and reported a backlog of over 150,000 
requests.
70
 Clearly the thirst for information shows no sign of 
subsiding in the near future. 
 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the fight for codified access to government 
records at the federal level began in earnest in the early 1950s with a 
handful of open records advocates led by California congressman 
John Moss. The Freedom of Information Act, signed into law by 
Lyndon Johnson in 1965, opened the door to a new era of citizen 
access to government information. The early years saw a barrage of 
requests for information, mostly from businesses and corporations 
who sought to improve their competitive status in the marketplace. 
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Yet, despite congressional intent and the attorney general’s directive 
that agencies embrace a new culture of openness, the government 
retrenched and actually began using the law as a tool for 
nondisclosure. Government agencies were especially prone to hide 
behind the executive privilege, trade secrets, internal memoranda, 
and investigatory exemptions. Although the courts attempted to 
balance the people’s right to know with the government’s need for 
secrecy in specific areas, it took a series of amendments to overcome 
court decisions that had effectively dismantled significant portions of 
the original law. The 1974 amendments strengthened the law, closed 
a number of loopholes, and paved the way for an explosion of new 
FOIA requests that began almost immediately after passage. 
Unfortunately, in the 50 years since the Freedom of Information Act 
was first passed, the government’s appetite for secrecy has in many 
ways continued unabated. With every new amendment added it 
seems that executive agencies and departments find new ways to 
avert disclosing their records.  
Since its passage, the federal Freedom of Information Act has 
influenced state and local open records legislation nationwide. 
Although many states had already passed their own laws, the FOIA 
inspired others to follow suit, while federal court decisions played an 
influential role in how state courts interpreted their own laws. As 
experts in the field of record keeping and access, archivists have a 
unique perspective in advocating for open records laws at all levels 
of government. This is particularly true for federal, state, and 
college-level archivists who must work within the confines of these 
legislative mandates. While understanding the importance of 
confidentiality and exercising profound respect for the individual’s 
right to privacy, archivists should continue to engage and promote 
legislative remedies to executive overreach. Indeed, in its statement 
of core values the Society of American Archivists maintains that, 
"although access may be limited in some instances, archivists seek to 
promote open access and use when possible. Access to records is 
essential . . . and use of records should be both welcomed and 
actively promoted."
71
   
As government agencies become ever more secretive, it is 
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incumbent upon the archival community to resist this trend. In the 
wake of the 1972 FOIA hearings, Representative John Moss 
analyzed the differences between democracies and dictatorships. In a 
democratic society, he noted, the people hold their leaders 
accountable through free elections and a fully informed electorate. 
Dictators, with utter contempt for the masses, must control both the 
flow of information and the people in order to protect the ruling elite. 
"If the few are adroit in their maneuverings — propaganda, secrecy, 
distortions, omissions, and outright lies — they can hold the reins of 
government" almost indefinitely, Moss contended. "A democracy 
without a free and truthful flow of information from government to 
its people is nothing more than an elected dictatorship. We can never 
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